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was not cruel and inhuman, and that the death row phenomenon is cruel 
and inhuman and therefore unconstitutional. Although the Constitution of 
Uganda does not empower or require the Court to refer to international law 
or foreign case law in interpreting the Constitution, the Court relied heavily 
on international human rights treaties and jurisprudence in arriving at its 
decision. This article has three purposes: one, to show how the Ugandan 
Court used international law and foreign case law in its judgment; two, to 
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Uganda be amended to empower or require courts to refer to international 
law and foreign case law in interpreting the country’s Constitution.
* LLB (Hons) (Makerere), LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa) (Pretoria), 
LLM (Human Rights Specialising in Reproductive and Sexual Health Rights) (Free 
State), LLD (Western Cape); djmujuzi@yahoo.com. I am grateful to Prof Julia Sloth-
Nielsen, Faculty of Law, UWC, for providing me with the funding I used in accessing 
most of the materials used in this article and to the anonymous referees for their 
constructive comments. The funding by OSF-SA and Ford Foundation to CSPRI and 
CLC is acknowledged. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
576
1 Introduction
On 21 January 2009, the Supreme Court of Uganda handed down 
the long-awaited judgment on appeal in the case of Attorney-General 
v Susan Kigula and 417 Others (Kigula case).1 This case was as a result 
of an appeal against the Constitutional Court’s finding that, amongst 
other things, the death penalty was not unconstitutional as it was 
allowed for under the Constitution, but that the mandatory death 
sentence in the Penal Code Act2 for murder was unconstitutional 
because it violated the accused’s right to a fair trial in the sense that he 
or she could not be heard in mitigation once found guilty of murder, 
and that hanging, as a form of execution, did not violate article 24 of 
the Constitution which prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading pun-
ishment.3 Following the Constitutional Court’s judgment, both the 
government and death row inmates appealed to the Supreme Court 
with the government arguing, inter alia, that the Constitutional Court 
erred in law when it found that the mandatory death penalty for mur-
der was unconstitutional.4 On the other hand, the death row inmates 
appealed against the Constitutional Court’s ruling that the death pen-
alty was not unconstitutional and therefore not a cruel, inhuman and 
degrading form of punishment because it was provided for under the 
Constitution.5 They also appealed against the Constitutional Court’s 
finding that hanging, as form of execution, was not a cruel and inhu-
man punishment within the meaning of article 24 of the Constitution 
and therefore not unconstitutional.6
On 21 January 2009, the Supreme Court finally handed down its 
judgment. It held, first, that the death penalty was constitutional as 
it was sanctioned under the Constitution and that the framers of the 
Constitution took into consideration Uganda’s history of grave human 
rights violations before including article 22(1) of the Constitution which 
provides that the right to life may be taken away as long as the manner 
in which it is taken away is not ‘arbitrary’; second, that the mandatory 
death sentence was unconstitutional because it violated the offender’s 
right to a fair trial in the sense that he cannot be heard in mitigation 
at sentencing and that it infringed the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers because it eliminated the judge’s discretion in determining which 
sentence fitted both the offence and the offender; three, that hang-
1 Attorney-General v Susan Kigula & 417 Others Constitutional Appeal 03 of 2006 (judg-
ment of 21 January 2009, unreported) Supreme Court of Uganda http://www.saflii.
org (accessed 20 September 2009).
2 Penal Code Act, Cap 120.
3 Susan Kigula & 417 Others v Attorney-General, Constitutional Petition 6 of 2003 (judg-
ment of 5 June 2005).
4 Kigula (n 1 above) 10.
5 As above.
6 Kigula (n 1 above) 2.
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ing as a form of execution was not a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment within the meaning of article 24 of the Constitution and 
therefore it was not unconstitutional and there was no evidence that 
other methods of execution, such as lethal injection, were less painful 
than hanging;7 and finally, that when a prisoner sentenced to death 
spends three years in detention after his appeal had been dismissed by 
the highest court and his application for the President to exercise his 
prerogative of mercy and commute his sentence has not been dealt with 
to know whether he has been granted reprieve or remission or would 
be executed, the death row phenomenon sets in, and that the death 
row phenomenon is cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and that 
executing a prisoner who has spent three years on death row is cruel, 
inhuman and degrading. The Court ordered that a prisoner’s sentence, 
who has been on death row for three years and more, should automati-
cally be commuted to ‘imprisonment for life without remission’.8
The Court’s judgment attracted considerable media coverage both 
in Uganda9 and abroad.10 However, it also confused prison authori-
ties on how they should deal with prisoners who had exhausted their 
appeals and had been on death row for more than three years.11 One 
of the striking elements of the Court’s judgment is the extent to which 
it relied on international human rights and foreign case law to resolve 
the issues it was dealing with. This article examines the status of inter-
7 For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the question of hang-
ing as a method of execution, see JD Mujuzi ‘Execution by hanging not torture or 
cruel punishment? Attorney-General v Susan Kigula and Others’ (2009) 3 Malawi Law 
Journal 133–146.
8 Kigula (n 1 above) 63.
9 L Afedraru et al ‘Uganda Supreme Court upholds death sentence’ Daily 
Monitor 22 January 2009 http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Ugan-
dan_Supreme_Court_upholds_death_sentence_78608.shtml (accessed 24 January 
2009); Editorial ‘Positives from ruling on the death penalty’ Daily Monitor 23 January 
2009 http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/opinions/ Positives_from_rul-
ing_on_the_death_penalty_78644.shtml (accessed 24 January 2009); A Mugisa 
et al ‘Death sentence judgment puzzles lawyers’ The New Vision 22 January 2008 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/668974 (accessed 24 January 2009); A Mugisa 
& H  Nsambu ‘Supreme Court retains death penalty’ The New Vision 21 January 2009 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/668812 (accessed 24 January 2009).
10 ‘Uganda court keeps death penalty’ BBC News 21 January 2009 http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7841749.stm (accessed 24 January 2009); ‘Uganda’s Supreme 
Court declares death penalty right’ Guardian Newspaper 22 January 2009 http://
www.ngrguardiannews.com/africa/article02//indexn3_html?pdate=220109&
ptitle=Uganda’s%20supreme%20cour%20declares%20death%20penalty%20
right&cpdate=240109 (accessed 24 January 2009). 
11 See T Butagira et al ‘Death penalty ruling puzzles prison bosses’ Saturday Monitor 
24 January 2009 http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Death_penalty_
ruling_puzzles_prison_bosses_78725.shtml (accessed 24 January 2009), where it 
is reported that ‘[t]he Supreme Court ruling that prisoners, who have stayed on 
death row for more than three years, after exhausting all appeals, should not be 
executed but imprisoned for life has confused prison officials. Saturday Monitor has 
learnt that the officials are puzzled about how to handle condemned persons still 
in formal confinement. Dr Johnson Byabashaija, the [C]ommissioner [G]eneral of 
national law in the Constitution of Uganda and thereafter discusses the 
Court’s reliance on international law.
2 International human rights instruments under 
the Constitution of Uganda and their relevance in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights
The history of Uganda has been characterised by gross human rights 
violations, a fact which the Supreme Court took judicial notice of.12 
Thus, during the debates that preceded the making of the 1995 
Constitution,13 the Uganda Constitutional Commission14 and 
the Constituent Assembly15 emphasised that the new Constitution 
should contain most of the rights included in international human 
rights instruments to which Uganda was party at the time16 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration). The 
Supreme Court observed that17
[t]he framers of the Constitution were aware of the various United Nations 
instruments, particularly those to which Uganda is a party. That is why 
article 287 provided for the continuation of treaties and conventions to 
which Uganda is a party.
The Bill of Rights indeed covers, at great length, all the rights in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The Constitution of Uganda mentions international law in various 
respects: It provides that ‘the foreign policy of Uganda shall be based 
on the principles of … (b) respect for international law and treaty 
obligations’;18 it empowers the Uganda Human Rights Commission 
‘to monitor the government’s compliance with international treaty 
and convention obligations on human rights’,19 and provides that any 
treaty or agreement to which Uganda was a state party before the com-
ing into force of the Constitution (in 1995) was not to be affected by 
Uganda Prisons, said the government needs to clarify if the … decision, arising from a 
petition by some 417 death row inmates to have the court quash the death sentence, 
would apply retrospectively. “We are going to write to the Attorney-General … for 
advice because the Supreme Court ruling has got implications on all persons who 
have gone through all appeals [and stayed thereafter] on death row for more than 
three years.”’ 
12 Kigula (n 1 above) 20.
13 The 1995 Constitution repealed the 1967 Constitution.
14 See generally Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission: Analysis and Recom-
mendations, UPPC, Entebbe (1993).
15 Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Official Report, Content) August-September 
1994 (when the draft Bill of Rights was being debated).
16 Kigula (n 1 above) 20.
17 Kigula (n 1 above) 22.
18 Objective XXVIII(b) of National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. 
19 Art 52(1)(h).
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the coming into force of the Constitution and Uganda was to continue 
to be party to it.20
Whereas the Constitution recognises the importance of international 
treaties to which Uganda is a party, neither the Constitutional Court 
nor the Supreme Court is empowered to refer to international human 
rights treaties to which Uganda is party in interpreting the Constitu-
tion, and especially the Bill of Rights.21 This position can be contrasted 
with that in the Constitutions of Malawi22 and South Africa,23 where 
courts are expressly required to refer to international law and foreign 
law (in the case of South Africa) and comparable foreign case law (in 
the case of Malawi) in interpreting the Constitution. The lack of a pro-
vision expressly requiring the courts to consider international law in 
interpreting the Constitution has resulted in situations where, in some 
cases, international law is completely ignored in circumstances where 
it should have been considered to enrich the court’s jurisprudence, for 
example where the applicants have referred to it in their submissions,24 
and also situations, like the case that forms the subject matter of this 
article, where international human rights law is given prominence 
although neither the respondents nor the appellants referred to it in 
their grounds of appeal and cross-appeal.25 In the United States, 
where the Constitution does not require courts to refer to international 
law in reaching their decisions, it has been observed that26
[t]here is a jurisprudential battle looming over the Supreme Court between 
the justices who support the use of international law in constitutional 
interpretation and the other side, headed unofficially by Justice Scalia, who 
considers the practice completely inappropriate.
In Uganda, at present, the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court 
judges have not, at least in public, shown that they are opposed to 
20 Art 287.
21 See arts 132 & 137 of the Constitution.
22 Art 11(2)(c) which provides that ‘[i]n interpreting the provisions of this Constitution 
a court of law shall — where applicable, have regard to current norms of public 
international law and comparable foreign case law’.
23 Sec 39(1) provides that ‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum — (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law’.
24 Eg, Law and Advocacy for Women in Uganda v Attorney-General of Uganda, Con-
stitutional Petitions 13/05 and 05/06 (judgment of 5 April 2007, unreported). 
Although the Constitutional Court held that some provisions of the Penal Code and 
Succession Act were unconstitutional for violating women’s right to freedom from 
discrimination, it did not refer to international human rights instruments although 
the petitioners argued that the impugned provisions also violated these treaties to 
which Uganda is party, such as the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women.
25 Kigula (n 1 above) 4–9.
26 H Arnould ‘Lawrence v Texas and Roper v Simmons: Enriching constitutional interpre-
tation with international law’ (2008) 22 Saint John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 
685 685–686.
using international law in interpreting the Constitution.27 What follows 
is a discussion of how the Supreme Court invoked international human 
rights law in arriving at its conclusions in the Kigula case.
3 The Supreme Court’s reliance on international 
human rights instruments and jurisprudence
Uganda is a dualist country where, before a treaty can be relied upon 
by any court, it has to, at least in theory, first be domesticated through 
enabling legislation. However, although most of the treaties referred to 
by the Supreme Court were ratified by Uganda, they have never been 
domesticated. It could be argued that Ugandan judges have become 
like other common law judges in countries such as Botswana, Ghana 
and Nigeria,28 who ‘are increasingly abandoning their traditional dual-
istic orientation to treaties and are beginning to utilise human rights 
treaties despite the absence of implementing legislation giving domes-
tic legal effect to the treaties’.29 As mentioned earlier, in the Kigula case 
the Supreme Court was dealing with the following issues: the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty; the constitutionality of the mandatory 
death penalty for murder; the constitutionality of hanging as a mode of 
execution; and the question regarding the death row phenomenon.
27 In Paul Kawanga Ssemwogerere & Others v Attorney-General of Uganda (Constitu-
tional Petition 5 of 2002) [2003] UGCC 4 (21 March 2003), in which the petitioners 
challenged the constitutionality of some provisions of the Political Parties and 
Organisations Act 18 of 2002, for, inter alia, imposing unjustifiable restrictions on the 
activities of political parties and organisations, thus rendering them non-functional 
and inoperative contrary to the Constitution. One of the issues was whether the 
impugned provisions violated the international human rights instruments men-
tioned in the petition. The Supreme Court unanimously held that, inter alia, ‘[t]he 
International Human Rights Conventions mentioned in the petition are not part of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Therefore, a provision of an Act of Parlia-
ment cannot be interpreted against them. This issue was therefore misconceived.’ 
See para 6. In Charles Onyango Obbo & Another v Attorney-General (Constitutional 
Appeal 2 of 2002) [2004] UGSC 1 (11 February 2004), Mulenga J of the Supreme 
Court, in holding that sec 50 of the Penal Code Act which criminalised the publica-
tion of false news was unconstitutional on the ground that the limitations it imposed 
could not be justified in a free and democratic society, referred to art 9 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (paras 
1 and 2) and art 10 of ICCPR and concluded that, inter alia, ‘[f]rom the foregoing 
different definitions, it is evident that the right to freedom of expression extends 
to holding, receiving and imparting all forms of opinions, ideas and information. 
It is not confined to categories, such as correct opinions, sound ideas and truthful 
information’. 
28 RF Oppong ‘Re-imagining international law: An examination of recent trends in the 
reception of international law into the national legal systems in Africa’ (2007) 30 
Fordham International Law Journal 296 313.
29 MA Waters ‘Creeping monism: The judicial trend towards interpretative incorpora-
tion of human rights treaties’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 628.
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Unlike the case in countries like the United States, where ‘courts have 
long resisted attempts to construe their legal texts in light of biding 
[international human rights] instruments’,30 at the outset, in dealing 
with the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court 
observed that ‘[i]n discussing this matter we will make reference to 
international instruments on the subject matter’.31 This was so in spite 
of the fact that none of the counsel, either for the respondents or for the 
appellants, urged the Court to examine international law. The Court 
referred to the Preamble and to articles 3 (the rights to life, liberty and 
security of person) and 5 (freedom from torture, and so on) of the 
Universal Declaration, and held that the Universal Declaration did not 
abolish the death penalty, and that ‘even as the … [Universal Declara-
tion] was being proclaimed, death sentences passed by international 
tribunals were being carried out against war criminals in Germany and 
Japan’.32 The Court referred to articles 6(1), (2), (4) and 7 of ICCPR 
and held that those provisions did not abolish the death penalty, but 
that they require that the right to life should not be arbitrarily taken 
away and, according to the Court, the execution of the death penalty 
did not amount to torture.33 The Court held that articles 6(1), (2), 
(4) and 7 of ICCPR ‘are in pari materia with articles 22(1) and 24 of 
the Constitution of Uganda’.34 To emphasise its point that the death 
penalty is not unconstitutional and its imposition would not amount 
to Uganda’s violation of its international obligations under ICCPR, 
the Court referred to the Human Rights Committee’s decision in Ng v 
Canada35 and observed that36
… the extradition of a fugitive to a country which enforces the death sen-
tence in accordance with the requirements of the … [ICCPR] could not be 
regarded as a breach of the obligations of the extraditing country.
While referring to article 6(6) of ICCPR, which states that nothing in 
the Covenant shall prevent state parties from abolishing the death 
penalty, the Court ruled that ‘[i]n Uganda, although the Constitution 
provides for the death sentence, there is nothing to stop Uganda as 
a member of the United Nations (UN) from introducing legislation 
to amend the Constitution and abolish the death sentence’.37 The 
Court also referred to article 4 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) and held that what it prohibits is the 
30 Y Shany ‘How supreme is the supreme law of the land? Comparative analysis of the 
influence of international human rights treaties upon the interpretation of constitu-
tional texts by domestic courts’ (2006) 31 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 341.
31 Kigula (n 1 above) 12.
32 Kigula (n 1 above) 13–14.
33 Kigula (n 1 above) 14–15.
34 Kigula (n 1 above) 15.
35 Communication No 469/1991.
36 Kigula (n 1 above) 16.
37 As above.
‘arbitrary’ deprivation of the right to life and that a death sentence 
imposed and executed in accordance with the law does not amount to 
an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life,38 and that the right to life in 
the Constitution of Uganda is not absolute because ‘[h]ad the framers 
intended to provide for a non-derogable right to life, they would have 
so provided expressly’.39 The Court added that article 22(1) of the Con-
stitution ‘[c]learly … conforms to the international human instruments 
… particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
to which Uganda is a party’.40 In light of the above international human 
rights instruments, the Court concluded that ‘… it is recognised that 
for various reasons some countries still consider it desirable to have 
capital punishment on their statute books. The retention of capital 
punishment by itself is not illegal … or a violation of international law’41 
and that ‘[c]learly, inclusion of the death penalty in the Constitution 
was therefore not accidental or a mere afterthought. It was carefully 
deliberated upon’,42 taking into consideration Uganda’s international 
human rights obligations.
On the question of whether hanging, as a method of execution, is 
torture, cruel and inhuman, the Supreme Court referred to the defini-
tion of torture in article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and in 
particular emphasised the last part which is to the effect that torture 
‘does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions’43 and held that the definition of torture 
under CAT ‘leaves no doubt that it does not apply to a lawful death 
sentence’.44 The Court also referred to the UN Resolution on Safe-
guards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing Death 
Penalty,45 especially paragraph 9 which provides that ‘where capital 
punishment occurs, it shall be carried out so as to inflict the minimum 
possible suffering’ to conclude that ‘[w]hat is recognised is that suf-
fering must necessarily be part of the death process, but that it must 
be minimised’.46 The Court found that hanging ‘caused death within 
minutes’ and therefore met the ‘standard of not causing excessive pain 
or suffering’.47
In his partly dissenting judgment, Justice Egonda Ntende, after refer-
ring to the chilling affidavit which indicated what happens from the time 
38 Kigula (n 1 above) 18–19.
39 Kigula (n 1 above) 33.
40 Kigula (n 1 above) 23.
41 Kigula (n 1 above) 20.
42 Kigula (n 1 above) 22.
43 Kigula (n 1 above) 18.
44 Kigula (n 1 above) 17.
45 Resolution 1996/15.
46 Kigula (n 1 above) 61.
47 Kigula (n 1 above) 63.
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the President signs the death warrant to the moment the offender is 
executed,48 held that, although the death penalty was constitutional, 
hanging as a mode of execution was cruel and inhuman and violated 
article 24 of the Constitution. Justice Ntende relied on the European 
Court of Human Rights’ decision in Soering v The United Kingdom,49 
to hold that although the death penalty itself may not violate article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, its mode of execution 
may amount to a violation of article 3.50 He observed that51
[t]he reasoning of the European Court is very persuasive. The European 
Convention on Human Rights is the forerunner of the bill of rights found in 
many independence constitutions, and post independence constitutions. 
The jurisprudence of the European Court is therefore quite persuasive.
He also relied on Ng v Canada and observed that the Human Rights 
Committee held that, although article 6 of ICCPR allowed the impo-
sition of the death penalty in certain circumstances, its mode of 
execution should not be cruel and inhuman.52 He added that the 
Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence required that, in executing 
the death penalty, state parties to ICCPR should ensure that ‘the least 
possible physical and mental suffering’ is caused and that ‘hanging 
as practised in Uganda fails to meet that test’.53 He concluded in the 
following strong terms:54
It is worthwhile noting that Uganda acceded to the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political rights on 21st September 1995 and to the First 
Optional Protocol on 14th February 1996. At the very least the decisions of 
the Human Rights Committee are therefore very persuasive in our jurisdic-
tion. We ignore the same at peril of infringing our obligations under that 
treaty and international law. We ought to interpret our law so as not to be 
in conflict with the international obligations that Uganda assumed when it 
acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The above extracts from the Supreme Court’s ruling show that, 
although the Constitution of Uganda does not oblige or require the 
Supreme Court to consider or refer to international law in interpret-
ing the Constitution, the Court indeed referred not only to treaties to 
which Uganda is a party, but also to UN resolutions (soft law) and to 
the jurisprudence developed by the Human Rights Committee. The 
minority decision relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights. If the Supreme Court’s decision is compared 
with the 2007 judgment of the High Court of Malawi, in which the 
Court declared the mandatory death penalty to be unconstitutional, 
48 Kigula (n 1 above) 91–96.
49 Application 14038/88.
50 Kigula (n 1 above).
51 Kigula (n 1 above) 78.
52 Kigula (n 1 above) 78–80.
53 Kigula (n 1 above) 97.
54 Kigula (n 1 above) 80.
one realises that the Ugandan Court (which is not required to refer to 
international law in interpreting the Constitution) relied more on inter-
national law than the Malawian Court (which did not base its ruling on 
international jurisprudence although it referred to ICCPR).55 However, 
the most frustrating aspect about the Uganda Supreme Court’s deci-
sion is its complete disregard for the rich jurisprudence of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) on 
the question of the death penalty.56
4 The Supreme Court and foreign case law
Unlike the position in the United States, where ‘[t]he citation of foreign 
law has been a matter of controversy for several years’ and this con-
troversy has been ‘reflected in vigorous exchanges between Supreme 
Court Justices’57 and where ‘Justice Breyer takes the position that for-
eign case law is simply information like any other source — the same as 
… law journals, or academic lectures — and it should not receive any 
different treatment’,58 for many years, courts in Uganda, especially the 
highest courts, have referred to jurisprudence from other countries, 
especially Commonwealth countries, to resolve issues before them.59 
Courts in different countries, whether empowered or required or 
otherwise by domestic law to consider foreign law, refer to decisions 
from foreign courts that are of importance to the issues before them 
and this has resulted in what has come to be known as ‘the migration 
of constitutional ideas’60 — where ideas developed by interpreting the 
South Africa Constitution, for example, are followed in interpreting 
constitutions in other countries. The fact that courts in Uganda have 
always referred to or considered foreign case law in interpreting the 
Constitution and other pieces of legislation could explain why, in the 
Kigula case, the Supreme Court observed that ‘[o]ne must … bear 
in mind that different constitutions may provide for different things 
precisely because each Constitution is dealing with a philosophy and 
55 See Francis Kafantayeni v Attorney-General, Constitutional Case 12 of 2005 (judg-
ment of 27 April 2007). The court referred to foreign law extensively and to the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.
56 For a detailed discussion of some of the jurisprudence of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the death penalty, see L Chenwi Towards the aboli-
tion of the death penalty in Africa: A human rights perspective (2007) 66–73 103–105 
158–165. 
57 R Reed ‘Foreign precedents and judicial reasoning: The American debate and British 
practice’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 253. 
58 JJ Zehnder ‘Constitutional comparativism: The emerging risk of comparative law as a 
constitutional tiebreaker’ (2007) 41 Valparaiso University Law Review 1739 1767. 
59 See, eg, Paul Kawanga Ssemwogerere & Others v Attorney-General Constitutional 
Appeal 1 of 2002, where the Supreme Court refers to judgments from several Com-
monwealth countries.
60 See generally S Choudhry (ed) The migration of constitutional ideas (2006).
SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AND THE DEATH PENALTY 585
586 (2009) 9 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
circumstances of a particular country’, but that ‘[n]evertheless there 
are common standards of humanity that all constitutions set out to 
achieve’.61 It has been argued that62
[w]hile foreign case law provides a fertile source of authorities for use under 
the reason- borrowing approach, it also generates many complications that 
would not arise in domestic analysis and that [r]ecognising the chief varia-
tions between … [different legal systems] will help avoid unproductive or 
misleading reliance on foreign case law.
How did foreign case law find its way into the Kigula decision? Was it 
at the Court’s own volition, as was the case with international human 
rights instruments and jurisprudence, that foreign case law found its 
way into this judgment? Unlike with regard to international law, it was 
counsel on both sides that invoked foreign case law to support their 
positions. In his submission counsel for the respondent argued that the 
death penalty was a cruel and inhuman punishment which violated 
article 24 of the Constitution. To support his argument, he cited the 
Tanzania High Court case of Republic v Mbuushu (1994) and the South 
African Constitutional Court case of State v Makwanyane (1995), in 
which both courts declared the death penalty to be a cruel and inhu-
man punishment.63 In what appeared to be a foregone conclusion that 
the Supreme Court was likely to refer to case law from different coun-
tries, counsel for the respondent ‘urged … court not to rely on case law 
from jurisdictions [like Nigeria] that did not have … [a provision that the 
right to freedom from torture was absolute] in their Constitutions’.64 
In determining whether the death penalty amounts to cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment, the Court cited several decisions from the 
Supreme Court of the United States on this question65 and held that 
‘by majority in Gregg v Georgia … [the US Supreme Court] rejected the 
decision in Furman that the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual’.66 
The Court added that ‘[w]e cannot say that those states in the United 
States of America, or indeed anywhere else in the world who retain the 
death penalty, have not evolved standards of decency’.67 The Court 
distinguished the Makwanyane decision by holding that, unlike in the 
Ugandan Constitution, where the right to life is not absolute, the Mak-
wanyane decision was based on a Constitution that provides for an 
absolute right to life.68
61 Kigula (n 1 above) 12.
62 RR Zubaty ‘Foreign law and the US Constitution: Delimiting the range of persuasive 
authority’ (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review 1413 1440.
63 Kigula (n 1 above) 10.
64 Kigula (n 1 above) 11.
65 Kigula (n 1 above) 27–29.
66 Kigula (n 1 above) 30.
67 Kigula (n 1 above) 31.
68 Kigula (n 1 above) 34–37.
On the issue of the constitutionality of the mandatory death sen-
tence, counsel for the respondent relied on case law from Pakistan and 
the Privy Council to argue that it violated the right to a fair trial in the 
sense that it denied the offender an opportunity to plead in mitiga-
tion, yet ‘[m]itigation is an element of fair trial’.69 He also cited case law 
from the United States of America and the 2007 Malawian decision of 
Kafantayeni and Others v Attorney-General (in which the High Court of 
Malawi held that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional 
for, inter alia, violating the doctrine of separation of powers and the 
right to a fair trial) to support his argument that the mandatory death 
penalty violated the right to a fair trial.70 Unlike on the question of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court, on the question of 
the constitutionality of the mandatory death sentence, did not discuss, 
let alone distinguish case law from other jurisdictions, even though 
counsel for the respondent, as shown, cited these cases.
On the question of whether to execute a person who has been on 
death row for more than three years (after the death row phenomenon 
has set in), counsel for the respondent cited cases from countries such 
as Jamaica and Zimbabwe to argue that it was inhuman and degrad-
ing to execute such a person.71 On the other hand, counsel for the 
appellant also cited case law from countries where it has been held 
that the delay in executing a person who has been sentenced to death 
is not unconstitutional.72 The Court referred to the Zimbabwean 
decision of Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe v 
Attorney-General and Others73 and held that ‘the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe set aside the death sentences because the appellants had 
been on death row for five years, in “demeaning conditions”’.74 The 
Court held that being on death row for more than three years in poor 
prison conditions was unconstitutional as the offenders were serving 
a sentence of imprisonment, yet they were sentenced to a different 
sentence — that of death.
On the question of hanging as a method of executing the death 
penalty, the respondents argued that it was cruel and inhuman and 
that ‘hanging had been stated to be a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment in the Mbuushu and Makwanyane cases’.75 The respon-
dents also relied on the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace case 
to argue that hanging was cruel, inhuman and degrading.76 Counsel 
for the respondents ‘conceded that every punishment involves pain, 
69 Kigula (n 1 above) 39.
70 Kigula (n 1 above) 39.
71 Kigula (n 1 above) 46.
72 Kigula (n 1 above) 45–46.
73 (1993) 2 LRC 279.
74 Kigula (n 1above) 48.
75 Kigula (n 1 above) 58.
76 Kigula (n 1 above) 57–58.
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but submitted that the degree of pain in hanging was excessive’.77 
Counsel for the appellant conceded that ‘even if it is found that the 
death penalty is provided for in the Constitution, then the manner of 
carrying it out by hanging is unconstitutional as it constitutes a cruel 
and degrading punishment’.78 In responding to these arguments, the 
Court observed that79
[i]n the Mbuushu case … the High Court considered the totality of the death 
penalty, ie, the sentence itself and the manner of carrying it out, in coming 
to the conclusion that the death penalty was a cruel punishment.
However, the Court, without examining the decisions of Mbuushu and 
Makwanyane, found that there was no evidence that hanging caused 
excessive pain or suffering for it to amount to cruel and degrading 
punishment.
As in the case with international human rights law, the Supreme 
Court examined jurisprudence from other countries to reach some of 
the decisions. This was the case, as mentioned earlier, albeit that the 
Constitution does not empower or require it to do so. One could argue 
that reference to foreign case law is done as a matter of practice and 
that, although unlikely, it is not impossible that future judges of the 
Supreme Court could change this practice on the basis that those deci-
sions are based on circumstances different from those in Uganda. In 
countries where the constitutions do not empower or require judges 
to refer to foreign case law, the question is ‘whether it is legitimate for 
a judge to consult foreign case law to help decide a domestic case’.80 
In England, for example,81
Lord Bingham noted that even though the House of Lords has on a number 
of occasions ‘gained valuable insights from the reasoning of Common-
wealth judges deciding issues under different human rights instruments … 
the United Kingdom courts must take their lead from Strasburg’.
The US Supreme Court, for example, has sometimes referred to foreign 
case law and international law in some of its decisions, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the Constitution does not empower or oblige it to do 
so, apart from English law before the enactment of the US Constitution. 
However, the justices of the US Supreme Court are now sharply divided 
on whether international law and foreign law should be considered in 
interpreting the Constitution with ‘[t]hose who favour international 
law as an interpretative tool emphasise the “increasing number of 
domestic legal questions that directly implicate foreign or international 
law”’. They also stress that the growing number of constitutional issues 
77 Kigula (n 1 above) 59.
78 Kigula (n 1 above) 60.
79 Kigula (n 1 above) 59 (emphasis in original). 
80 A Hamann & HR Fabri ‘Transnational networks and constitutionalism’ (2008) 6 Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law 481 501.
81 R Singh ‘Interpreting bills of rights’ (2008) 29 Statute Law Review 82–99 94. 
addressed by foreign courts can serve as helpful comparisons. Those 
who oppose it claim that ‘however enlightened’ the justices of other 
nations are, their views ‘cannot be imposed upon Americans through 
the Constitution’.82
5 Conclusion and recommendations
The Supreme Court should be commended for relying on international 
and regional human rights treaties and jurisprudence in interpreting 
the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It is recommended that the 
Constitution of Uganda should be amended to expressly empower or 
require courts to refer to international law, especially to human rights 
treaties to which Uganda is a party, and foreign law in interpreting the 
Bill of Rights. The amendment should expressly require the Court to 
refer to jurisprudence, if any, developed by the African human rights 
bodies. This would ensure that courts give regional jurisprudence 
priority over jurisprudence developed by other bodies, like the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. A constitutional amendment requiring 
courts to refer to international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights will 
also enrich the jurisprudence of the Court. It would ensure that in the 
future, as it has happened in the USA, when judges who do not sup-
port reference to international law are appointed to the Court, they do 
not reverse the gains made so far in this area. An amendment to the 
Constitution to require or empower courts to refer to foreign case law 
should not mean that courts will be obliged to follow such case law. 
They will, of course, as they have done before, as in the Kigula case, 
treat foreign case law as persuasive as opposed to binding. Courts will 
also be at liberty to assess whether the utilisation of constitutional ideas 
from different courts interpreting constitutions adopted in different 
circumstances to deal with different issues would be to the advantage 
of the development of jurisprudence in Uganda.
82 Arnould (n 26 above) 686.
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